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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of 
acquisition research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) 
put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary 
draft of an eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a 
technical note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among 
practitioners and researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of 
mutual importance.   A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and 
research institutions to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its 
infant stages.  The primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition 
issues/problems that will become part of the acquisition professional body of 
knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical reports, 
as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or as a variety of other 
similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working- 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
challenged, examined and articulated.
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Abstract 
Acquisition transformation has brought numerous changes to the way the 
Department of Defense (DoD) purchases goods and services, as well as to the way it 
manages the contractor’s performance after contract award.  One of the most significant 
changes has been the emphasis on the use of commercial goods and services coupled 
with the use of performance-based contracts to satisfy mission-critical needs.  
As the performance of contractors has become more critical to the mission, there 
has been a significant reduction in the number of acquisition personnel available to 
perform what traditionally has been referred to as “contract administration tasks.”  In 
addition, with the increase in the amount of services contracts, there has been a change 
in the skills needed to manage contracts after award.  
Contract administration is currently undergoing a paradigm shift because of 
changes to what the DoD buys and to how purchases are being made. The move to 
minimize the importance of detailed specifications and to rely on commercial processes 
requires more management than administrative skills.  The bottom line is that new 
methods and skills must be explored and developed to more effectively perform what 
traditionally has been referred to as “contract administration.“  
This study, which addresses contracts at the micro level, concludes the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 represents a viable 
framework by which contracts should be structured, as well as managed.  The Act 
requires managers in the Executive Branch to develop strategic plans and use 
performance indicators to measure output and to evaluate the outcome of the contract, 
as well as the contractor’s performance. 
The study also recommends Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard method of 
performance measurement, together with Contractor Performance Information (Past 
Performance Reporting) requirements, can be adapted to the management of contracts.  
Past Performance reporting and tracking requirements define—in general terms—the 
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buyer’s perspective of what is expected from the contractor. The Balanced Scorecard 
methodology enables managers to then identify the critical success factors and critical 
measures for each expatiation.  Both parties will benefit by jointly managing these 
indicators concurrently throughout the life of the contract, rather than reacting to after-
the-fact reporting. The goal of such requirements is to add joint accountability for results 
to the buyer-seller relationship.   
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Introduction 
Acquisition transformation has brought numerous changes to the way the 
Department of Defense (DoD) purchases goods and services, as well as to the way it 
manages the contractor’s performance after contract award.  One of the most significant 
changes has been the emphasis on the use of commercial goods and services coupled 
with the use of performance-based contracts to satisfy mission-critical needs.  
As the performance of contractors has become more critical to the mission, there 
has been a significant reduction in the number of acquisition personnel available to 
perform what traditionally has been referred to as “contract administration tasks.”  In 
addition, with the increase in the amount of services contracts, there has been a change 
in the skills needed to manage contracts after award.  
Contract administration is currently undergoing a paradigm shift because of 
changes to what the DoD buys and to how purchases are being made. The move to 
minimize the importance of detailed specifications and to rely on commercial processes 
requires more management than administrative skills.  The bottom line is that new 
methods and skills must be explored and developed to more effectively perform what 
traditionally has been referred to as “contract administration.”   
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The Primary Research Question 
The primary research question is: can performance measurement be used to 
manage a contractor’s performance after contract award? This question is raised in 
response to a widespread concern regarding the effectiveness of management 
techniques used by the federal government to manage contractor performance after 
contract award.  In addition, acquisition reform has placed increased emphasis on the 
use of commercial products and services, including the use of performance-based 
contracting to satisfy mission-critical needs. These factors, coupled with significant 
reductions in size and skill level of the acquisition workforce, mean new methods must 
be explored to perform what have traditionally been called the “contract administration 
functions.” 
The following criteria guided this study and its answer to the primary research 
question: 
• The performance measurement process must be compatible with the overall 
management planning and control process of the federal government. 
• The performance measurement process must also be compatible with what the 
agency buys and the way it buys it. 
• The performance measurement process must add value to the buyer-seller 
relationship.  
• To be selected, the performance measurement process must be subject to cost - 
benefit trade-off analysis.    
Scope of the Research  
This research will concentrate on the federal acquisition process. More 
specifically, it will be centered on the contractor’s performance after contract award and 
how the government fulfills its oversight responsibilities after contract award.  It will not 
address measuring the effectiveness or efficiency of Government contracting 
organizations at the macro level.     
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Figure 1. Theme 1 
Foundation and Framework for How the Federal Government 
Should Do Business Every Day  
The idea of integrating performance into the federal budget process is not new.  
Since the Hoover Commission proposed “performance budgeting” in 1949, there has 
been continued interest on the part of the Legislative Branch in measuring the results 
achieved in the past and linking them to future budgets. (See Figure 1.) The Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) introduced in the 1960’s, and the Zero-
Based Budgeting System employed during the Carter Administration are just two 
examples of structures which tried to correlate program objectives both to results and to 
the means of achieving program goals. 2 
A more recent example of a governmental attempt to determine how effective an 
agency is in managing its programs is the Government Performance and Results Act 
                                            
1 Dick Armey, Armey’s Axioms (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons), 251. 
2 James J. Cavanagh, et al., “The Balanced Scorecard for Managing Procurement Performance,” 
Contract Management, (February 1999): 13. 
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(GPRA) of 1993.  GPRA requires departments and agencies to have long-range 
strategic plans, develop measurable outcomes and to report results achieved annually 
for each program in their budgets. Previously, managers concentrated on administrating 
the processes and reporting how well they were functioning rather than on being 
concerned if the output satisfied the goals upon which the program was based. 3 
The bottom line for most government agencies is their mission: what they want to 
achieve. Under GPRA, what the agency wants to achieve is expressed in its strategic 
plans.  These plans also include performance indicators to be used to measure the 
outputs and evaluate the outcomes of each program. The primary goals of GPRA are to 
ensure strategic planning drives budgeting and that resource decisions reflect specific 
strategic priorities, not just any “firestorm” that occurs. 4 
David M. Walker, comptroller general of the United States, writing in The Public 
Manager, emphasized the importance of the management concept contained in GRPA 
to how supervisors in the public sector should manage. He asserts, “GPRA provides the 
foundation and framework for how the federal government does business every day.” 5 
The key to strategic success under this act is an understanding of the elements 
of the GPRA framework and their interrelationships.   
• The congressional budget includes a strategic performance plan that defines 
what major programs the agency intends to accomplish. 
• Strategic performance plans are designed to establish a “bottom line” to which 
each government program can be held accountable.   
• Activities are actions and tasks performed within the organization to produce 
outputs (goods or services).   
                                            
3  Thomas G. Kessler and Patricia Kelly, The Business of Government: Strategy, Implementation and 
Results, Management Concepts, (Vienna, VA: Management Concepts, 2000), 50.  
4  James B. Whittaker, President’s Management Agenda, A Balanced Scorecard Approach, (Vienna, VA: 
Management Concepts, 2003), 1.  ` 
5 David Walker, “Managing By Results to Benefit Our Citizens.” The Public Manager   
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• Performance indicators are particular values or characteristics that are used to 
measure outputs and/or outcomes.  They include such factors as timeliness, 
quality, product integrity, customer satisfactions, and quantity.   
• Output is the goods or services produced by a program. 
• Outcomes are the things that occur as a result of output when the customer 
receives and uses the goods or services produced.6 (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2. The GPRA Performance Accountability Framework 7 
The National Partnership for Reinventing Government (National Performance 
Review), which was established to make government run more efficiently and 
effectively, continued the GPRA theme.  This was followed by three other pieces of 
legislation that required strategic plans to describe how each government agency will 
deliver quality results and then measure its performance in terms of output and 
outcomes. These pieces of legislation were the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
                                            
6  Kessler and Kelly, 56-61. 
7 Lawrence L. Martin, Making Performance-Based Contracting Perform: What the Federal Government 
Can Learn from State and Local Governments, New Ways to Manage Series (Arlington, VA: IBM Center 
for Endowment for the Business of Government, Nov. 2002), 13. 
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1994, the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 and the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Clinger-Cohen Act). 
Some agencies and departments have also adapted Kaplan and Norton’s 
balanced scorecard approach and are using balanced performance measures to 
evaluate performance of their organization as a whole. As the name implies, the 
balanced scorecard does not concentrate on just measuring financial performance.  It is 
multidimensional and includes the customer’s perspective, internal processes’ 
perspective, and learning and growth as measurements of the financial perspective in 
order to obtain some balance of these categories in relation to mission achievement. 
This approach allows managers to consider whether improvements in one area are 
being achieved at the expense of another.  Examples of the use of the balanced 
scorecard by public organizations include Naval Undersea Warfare Center, FAA 
Logistics Center, Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Transportation. 8 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations Guide to Acquisition of 
Goods and Services 
It is the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) that provides the foundation to 
guide the acquisition of goods and services procured by the Executive Branch.  The 
FAR includes a strategic planning perspective in the form of a “primary vision” for the 
federal acquisition system.  The vision statement dictates: the primary goal of the 
acquisition system is to “deliver on a timely basis a best value product or service to the 
customer, while maintaining the public trust and fulfilling public policy objectives.” (See 
Figure 3.) 
The FAR goes on to enumerate four major critical success factors by which the 
process should be evaluated.  These are,  
• Customer satisfaction of cost, quality, and timeliness 
                                            
8 Whittaker, 249-257. 
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• Minimization of administrative cost 
• Maintenance of the public trust, and 
• Fulfillment of public policy objectives. 9 
 
Figure 3. Acquisition Vision and Performance Standards 
Each of these critical success factors lends itself to the establishment of 
performance indicators which measure the output and outcome as they are presented in 
the GPRA framework. 
For defense weapons systems, Department of Defense 5000 (DoD 5000) series 
directives govern all acquisition programs.  Important to the management of each 
defense program is the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).  The APB serves as a 
critical success indicator because the baseline also represents desired results in 
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establish program goals for a minimum number of cost, schedule and 
performance parameters that describe the program over its life cycle.  Approved 
program baseline parameters shall serve as control objectives. PM shall identify 
deviation from approved program baseline parameters and exit criteria.10 
In addition to ABP data, DoD Instruction 5000.2 contains references to fifty pieces of 
information required by the statutes or regulations that may be applicable during product 
development milestones and phases.  This regulatory program information is to be 
tailored to fit the particular conditions of each individual program. This program includes 
a Contractor Cost Data Report, which is required for non-commercial contracts not 
procured under competitive procedures that include information on major contracts and 
subcontracts for Acquisition Category I Programs over $50 million and high-risk or high-
technical interest contracts between $7 and $50 M.11  
Changing What We Buy and the Way We Buy It  
In FY 2002, the Federal Government continued its long-standing record as the 
largest buyer of goods and services in the world.  In that year, contract actions 
exceeded $250.2 billion.  Department of Defense (DoD) contracts represented 66% of 
that total—e.g., $164.7 billion. 
In the last ten years, there have been significant increases in the quantity of 
commercial items purchased by the DoD. Primary reasons for this were: (a) the fact that 
more and more innovative products are available commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
that would satisfy government requirements; (b) Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) has simplified procedures for procurement of low-cost, low-risk commercial 
supplies and services; and (c) military specifications and standards are replaced by 
performance standards or commercial standards when possible.  Consequently, FAR 
                                                                                                                                             
9 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 1.102  
10 Defense Acquisition System, DoD Directive 5000.1, 4.3.4 Discipline, May 12, 2003. 
11  Statutory, Regulatory, and Contract Reporting Information and Milestone Requirements, May 12, 2003, 
Enclosure 3, DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 9- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
policy now requires the contracting officer of each acquisition to initially look to the 
commercial market as a source for goods and services. 12    
The dollar value of purchases for services now exceeds what is spent for 
supplies and equipment.  In 2003, in particular, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
stated during the last five years DoD spent more to procure services than it did for 
supplies and equipment. In fact, approximately 50% of DoD’s spending in 2002 was for 
services. Between 1999 and 2002, spending for services increased approximately 19% 
to $93 billion.13 During this same period, the number of contractors grew by over 
727,000, while the civil service workforce decreased.14   
Part of this trend has been due to the fact that over the past few years, policy has 
emphasized consideration of private-sector firms as alternative service providers of 
tasks that can be classified as being inherently commercial. The Federal Activities 
Inventory Reform Act (FAIRA) calls for the head of each agency to decide which activity 
would be subject to competition under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76.15  
Two examples of activities that have been contracted out to the private sector 
have been facility maintenance and personnel support services at military installations 
and bases.  Information technology is another area considered to be commercial in 
nature and, therefore, subject to competitive sourcing.  
                                            
12 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 10.002  
13 Contract Management: High-Level Attention Needed to Transform DoD Services Acquisition, GAO 
Report. September 03, GAO-03-935. 
14 Jason Peckenpaugh, “Contractor Workload Grows as Civil Service Shrinks,” Government Executive 
Magazine (September 4, 2003).  In February 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revised 
A-76 to allow federal agencies to compete for this work against non-federal organizations.  The 
competition determines which service provider can supply mission-related support and meet business 
requirements at the best price without compromise to quality or performance.  In its April 12, 2004 edition, 
the Federal Times reported between 1998 and 2003 DoD civilian and acquisition personnel declined 
7.5%; likewise, civilian staffing of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) fell 23.6% 
15 Federal Acquisition Council, “Manager’s Guide to Competitive Sourcing,” Second Edition, February 20, 
2004. Competitive sourcing has been described as a “tool to help you benchmark your organizations 
against other possible service providers, to stimulate your organization to think of ways to change in order 
to become the best it can be.” And, “It involves conducting public-private reviews or competitions to 
assess how best to deliver services to the public.”  
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There have been other changes to what the federal government buys and how it 
purchases those goods and services. Beginning in 1995, acquisition managers have 
been encouraged to think more creatively and look for innovative ways to procure 
supplies and services.  This paradigm shift was propelled by two significant pieces of 
legislation which have been discussed previously, FASA and the FARA.  Both urged 
acquisition managers to look for alternative ways of doing business that was cheaper, 
better, and faster—as long as it made good business sense. The only constraint was 
that the FAR, Executive Order or agency regulations could not prohibit the particular 
course of action.16  
Examples of the some of the more significant changes are listed below.  Each 
was brought about by a policy that tolerated thinking-outside-the-box. (See Table 1.) 
1. Use of Government Purchase Cards: Government-wide policy has made use of 
the Purchase Cards as the preferred method of procuring commercial items 
below the micro-purchase threshold of $2,500 ($2,000 for construction). In FY 
2003, purchase card usage history showed there were 10.7 million purchase 
card transactions totaling $7.2 billion in sales; these sales thereby eliminated a 
significant workload which previously had been performed by contracting 
personnel and the management of relatively small-value purchases. 
2. Use of e-Commerce: The DoD has further facilitated the purchase of consumable 
supplies by establishing the DoD EMALL. The DoD EMALL’s objective is to be 
the single electronic point-of-entry for purchasers to locate and acquire off-the-
shelf, finished goods and services from the commercial market place as well as 
from government sources.  It creates a paperless environment, thereby 
simplifying the contracting job. 
3. Expanded Use of Federal Supply Schedules:  There has been a significant 
increase in the use of indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts.  Use 
of a Federal Supply Schedule permits contracting officers to initiate individual 
orders for supplies or services from commercial firms using IDIQ contracts 
previously established by the General Services Administration (GSA).  This 
system was not previously permitted because the source of contracting authority 
                                            
16  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 1.102d 
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was outside GSA. Under this method, however, the ordering agency is 
responsible for determining if contract performance is acceptable and for taking 
the necessary action if it is not.  This method, formerly known as the Federal 
Supply Schedule Program, accounted for contracts which totaled 7 billion dollars 
in FY 2002 alone.  It has not only simplified the contracting officers’ jobs by 
eliminating the need to participate in the source-selection process, but it has also 
greatly reduced procurement lead-times. 
4. Strategic Purchasing of Commodities: Use of Cross-functional Sourcing Teams’ 
Leverage in Terms of Buying Power by Strategic Source Centralized Purchasing: 
The services are now looking to optimize their buying power by creating 
“Commodity Councils.”  The objective is to develop centralized purchasing 
strategies for different commodities.  IBM, Daimler/Chrysler, and Cessna have 
successfully used it.  Adoption of this concept means the service will enter into 
enterprise-wide larger volume contracts with fewer suppliers rather than having 
each user contract for its own needs. This method of acquisition gives the buyer 
the advantages of leverage. It also eliminates a significant amount of 
administrative workload at multiple installations. 17  
5. Use of Performance-Based Contracting Methods: Performance-based contracts 
are structured around terms that describe measurable output, quality or 
outcomes in the form of measurable standards for the work to be performed, 
rather than broad or precise statements of work regarding the way services are 
to be performed.  This method of procurement emphasizes telling the provider 
what is wanted rather than how.   It also encourages contractor rewards for 
exceptional performance or fee reduction when performance is not satisfactory.  
It is DoD policy that 50% of all service contracts be performance-based by 2005.  
Experience has shown that although additional work is required with this method, 
initially describing tasks to be performed and quantifying desired outputs and 
outcomes greatly reduces the contracting officers’ involvement after contract 
award.  
                                            
17 For more on this subject see David Burt, Donald Dobler, and Stephen L. Starling, World Class Supply 
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Table 1. Results of Thinking-Out-Of-The-Box 
As government acquires more and more services via contract, the lead-time from 
acquisition decision to mission impact has become less and less. Regarding a weapon 
system, years can pass before the mission impact of a poor decision made during 
design, production, or provisioning of spare parts can be discovered.  In contrast, failure 
to perform a mission-critical service can have an almost instantaneous negative impact.  
This reality requires a re-examination of the relationships between the buyer and 
seller. Policies initiated during acquisition reform have made it possible to move away 
from an arms-length buyer-seller relationship in favor of greater communication and 
even inclusion of the contractor as a member of the Acquisition Team. 18  
Contractor Oversight after Contract Award 
Reform of federal procurement policy has resulted in increased flexibility for 
contracting officers, program managers, and other acquisition personnel. Changing 
times call for innovative ways to achieve results.  As noted above, this innovation 
occurred primarily in the methods by which supplies and services are purchased.  In 
                                            
18  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 1.102 (c) “The Acquisition Team consists of all participants […] 
including technical, supply, and procurement communities, but also the customers they serve, and the 
contractors who provide the products and services.”  
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relation to contracts, the impact of acquisition reform on the function of contract 
administration has not been fully recognized. 19  
After contract award, oversight of the contractor’s performance has traditionally 
been referred to as “contract administration.” The objectives of contract administration is 
to gain assurance that a quality product will be delivered to the ultimate user in 
accordance with cost and schedule projections, as well as to retain the confidence of 
the tax payer in proving his/her tax dollars are being spent wisely. 
Oversight includes the employment of government personnel for such tasks as 
monitoring contractor performance, inspecting and accepting delivered products or 
services, modifying the contract, resolving technical and delivery problems, reviewing 
contractor’s processes, auditing contractor systems, and applying rewards and 
penalties when needed. 20 
Professor Steve Kelman, former head of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP), and now a Professor of Public Management at John. F. Kennedy School 
of Government, believes contracting can no longer be considered primarily an 
administrative function.  His thesis is supported by the fact that a high percentage of an 
agency’s budget is spent on contracts for supplies and services.  He recommends 
contracting management be considered a core competence within each federal 
organization.  He believes critical responsibilities that accompany the job include 
performance measurement and management of the contractor. 21 
                                            
19  Wendell C. Lawther, Contracting in the 21st Century: A Partnership Model (Arlington, VA: 
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002), 6.  Professor Lawther ‘s 
thesis is: the reform of federal procurement policy has resulted in increased flexibility for contracting 
officers, program managers, and related procurement personnel. The impact of these reforms on the 
function of contract administration has not been fully recognized.  
20  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  42.302 list 65 “normal contract administration functions” which 
Administrative Contracting Officers have the authority to automatically carry out. 
21 Seven Kelman, “Remaking Federal Procurement: Visions of Governance in the 21st Century,” Working 
Paper No. 3, May 2002., 2. Professor Kelman supports this point by the fact the DoD, Department of 
Energy (DoE), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) spend a significant 
amount of their budgets on contracted products and services–46%, 94% and 78% respectively.  
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The nature and extent of contract administration varies from contract to contract.  
It can vary from a minimum level of involvement in the contractor’s activities to a 
maximum level of almost dictating the methods by which supplies and services are 
purchased.  This is in contrast to the impact of total engagement.22 The depth of 
oversight has traditionally taken one of the following approaches. (See Figure 4.) 
• Minimum oversight is associated with small-scale jobs, projects where the 
management and control is essentially left to the discretion of the supplier in the 
purchase of commercial items.  The contractor is most often permitted to follow 
its own production, assembly, testing and quality process/procedures.  For 
commercial items, inspection and testing by the government is completed in a 
manner consistent with accepted industry practices.   
• The intermediate level of oversight occurs when the procurement is large in 
scale, or the supplies and equipment being procured are unique to the 
government.  The buyer sometimes imposes extensive data collection and status 
reporting on the seller. However, in this situation, the seller’s managing systems 
and techniques generally provide the buyer with the necessary performance- 
status information. When government unique standards are required, the 
contractor can also be required to follow government production, assembly and 
testing processes as a term and condition of the contract. 
• The most intensive level involves large projects, research and development 
efforts or the acquisition of major systems. In this case, the supplier’s internal 
management systems and processes may not be fully acceptable. Also in this 
case, the buyer often imposes process specifications or standards of 
performance upon the supplier.  Often, the contractor is required to follow 
government production, assembly and testing processes as a term and condition 
of the contract.  
                                            
22  John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr. Administration of Government Contracts, Second Edition, 
Government Contracts program, (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1986), 2. 
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Figure 4. Level of Contractor Oversight by Government 
An important responsibility of contracting personnel after contract award is 
evaluating a contractor’s performance information on designated contracts on an annual 
basis, as well as at the time of completion of the contract.23  The FAR then requires the 
source-selection authority to reconsider this record of past performance for future 
source-selection purposes.  Knowledge of a contractor’s record of contract performance 
is seen as a way to mitigate the risk of selecting a contractor with a poor track record.    
Contractor performance reports are collected and maintained in a web-enabled 
library developed by Naval Sea Logistics Center for the DoD, commonly referred to as 
CPARS (Contractor Perform Assessment Reporting System).  The type of information 
reported includes:  
 
                                            
23 DoD Deviation to FAR 42.1502 requires evaluations of contractor performance for each contract in 
excess of: (a) $5,000,000 for systems and operational support, (b) $1,000,000 for services, information 
technology contracts, and (c) $100,000 for fuels and health care contracts. 
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• Contractor’s record of conforming to contract requirements and standards of 
good workmanship,  
• Contractor’s record of forecasting and controlling cost,  
• Contractor’s adherence to contract schedules, including the administrative 
aspects of performance contractor’s history of reasonable and cooperative 
behavior and commitment to customer satisfaction, and  
• Contractor’s business-like concern for the interests of the customer.  
The study concludes that both parties would jointly benefit by managing these indicators 
concurrently throughout the life of the contract, rather than reporting on them after-the-
fact. 
The Cost of Oversight 
Not gone unnoticed has been the premium paid by the government for the 
oversight methods and procedures used by the buyer to assure the timely delivery of 
the needed supplies, services and the confidence of the taxpayer.  Between 1986 and 
1992, at least six studies were made of the regulatory/oversight cost premium being 
passed on to the government buyer by contractors. Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) 
estimates of the added cost premium cited in these reports ranged from 5 to 50 percent 
in potential cost reductions.  The potential cost avoidance cited by all of these studies 
no doubt had an influence on FASA and other DoD acquisition policies before and after 
the Acquisition Streamlining Act in 1994.  A more recent assessment of the DoD 
regulation and oversight burden, published by RAND in 2001, estimated the oversight 
burden to range from 1 to 6 percent. 24  
                                            
24  Mark Lorell, and John C. Graser, An Overview of Acquisition reform Savings Estimates, (MR-1329-AF) 
Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 117-118. (Studies were performed by Honeywell in 
1986of contractor cost for 20 programs, RAND in 1988 of regulatory costs, Office of Technology 
Assessment in 1989 of total DoD acquisition budget, Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
1991 of cost premium on identical items, Carnegie Commission in 1992 of total DoD acquisition budget; 
and American Defense Preparedness Association in 1992 of product cost.)  
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However, there has been recent criticism regarding how well the DoD oversees 
contractor performance.  A recent example was a series of articles published in the 
Federal Times alleging that the number of auditors and inspectors had been cut back 
too far and the consequences were that the government was “being ripped-off.” 25  
In response to this criticism, Professor Kelman pointed out oversight is not 
costless…that fixating on traditional oversight methods while ignoring other critical 
contract management tasks (such as establishing performance metrics, inciting 
contractor technical experts and government subject-matter experts to share 
information, and motivating both government and contractor personnel to achieve 
results) is not the answer.26   
What is Performance Measurement?  
Performance is defined in the Random House Webster’s College Dictionary as: 
“The execution or accomplishment of work, acts, feats, etc. […] The act of performing. 
[It is] the manner in which, or efficiency with which something reacts or fulfills its 
intended purpose.” 27  
Professors Lebas and Euske state performance is continuous and has a cause 
and effect.  Performance exists only if outcome and results can be described or 
measured so as to be accurately communicated; only in this way can someone decide 
to do something within the shared model of causal relationships. Performance does not 
have the same meaning if the evaluator is inside, rather than outside the organization. 
Use of the term performance should be reserved for all processes that lead to a 
potential or future sequence of outcomes and results.28 
                                            
25  “Blind Trust: Who is watching DoD contractors?” Federal Times, (April 5, 12 and 19, 2004).. 
26  Steve Kelman, “Oversight is not the only way to judge a procurement system,” Federal Times. (May 31 
2004). 
27  Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, (New York: Random House, 1994)” 1003. 
28  Lebas and Kenneth Euske, “Theoretical and conceptual issues,” Business Performance Measurement: 
Theory and Practice, ed. A.D. Neely (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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The Government Accounting Standards Board views performance as a 
multidimensional concept consisting of outputs, quality and results.29   
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary defines measurement as “the act 
of measuring […] a dimension, extent, range, etc. or ascertained by measuring.” 30  
In its simplest terms, performance measurement is the comparison of actual 
levels of performance to pre-established target levels of performance. 31  (In the 
terminology of GPRA, this is comparing output to pre-established outcome objectives.)  
Traditionally, performance measurement has been a key element of what 
management gurus have referred to as the “control function.”  The objectives of 
performance measurement are: 
assessing progress toward achieving predetermined goals, including information 
on the efficiency with which resources are transformed into goods and services 
(outputs), quality of those outputs (how well they are delivered to clients and the 
extent to which clients are satisfied) and outcomes (the results of a program 
activity compared to its intended purpose) and the effectiveness of government 
operations in terms of their specific contributions to program objectives. 32  
In their book The Business of Government: Strategy, Implementation and 
Results, Thomas Kessler and Patricia Kelly recommend performance measures must 
be placed in any plan immediately after the statements of goals. This strategic location 
forces the planner to think critically to define applicable performance measures and tie 
                                            
29  Lawrence L. Martin, “Making Performance-Based Contracting Perform: What the Federal Government 
Can Learn from State and Local Governments,” New Ways to Manage Series (Arlington, VA: IBM 
Endowment for the Business of Government, November 2002), 13. 
30  Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1994), 840. 
31 “Establishing and Maintaining a Performance-Based Management Program,” The Performance-Based 
Management Handbook, Volume One, Performance-Based Management Special Interest Group (PBM 
SIG), September 2001. http:///www.orau.gov/pbm. 
32  James B. Whittaker, President’s Management Agenda, A Balanced Scorecard Approach (Vienna, VA: 
Management Concepts, 2003), 259. 
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them to each goal early in the planning process.  The authors go further by stating, in 
order to be effective, a performance measure must include the following elements (See 
Table 2): 
• Performance measures: Characteristics relative to the overall strategy, such as 
cost, cycle time, quality, and quantity. 
• Performance indicators: Unit of measure as dollars, hours, errors per 1000, 
number of reports each period that can be used to measure output and outcome. 
• Baseline: An initial starting measurement. 
• Performance target: Desired level of performance expressed as a tangible, 
measurable objective against which achievement can be compared relative to a 
baseline measure. 
• Tolerances: Acceptable ranges of variance from performance targets. 33 
 
 
Table 2. Elements of a Performance Measure  
                                            
33  Thomas G. Kessler and Patricia Kelly, The business of Government: Strategy, Implementation and 
Results (Vienna, VA: Management Concepts, 2000), 86. 
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As anyone in public or private industry can attest, performance measurement 
does not stop when variances from planned performance have been identified.  
Leading-edge organizations seek to create an efficient and effective performance-
management system. James Whitaker, author of President’s Management Agenda, A 
Balanced Scorecard Approach, dictates managers must also: 
use performance measurement information to effect positive change in 
organizational culture, systems, and processes by helping to set agreed-upon 
performance goals, allocating and prioritizing resources, informing managers to 
either confirm or change current policy or program directions to meet those 
goals, and sharing results of performance in pursuing those goals.  
These actions are part of the performance management system. 34 
Professor Marshall Meyer of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School 
provides a schematic of how performance measures are used (See Figure 5).  He 
contends performance measurement fulfills seven purposes.  In addition to serving as a 
control metric, which he refers to as “Look back,” performance metrics are also used to 
“Compensate,” “Motivate” and “Look Ahead” to assess the future.  Use of performance 
measures becomes even more significant as an organization increases in size.  In 
larger organizations (the area within the triangle), metrics are reported up in the chain of 
command (“Roll[ed] up”) so management can determine if the desired results have 
been achieved and can adjust goals or establish future goals accordingly. These are 
then “Roll[ed] Back” down the organization in the form of financial and non-financial 
objectives. Another value performance measurement this model provides is that it can 
                                            
34  Whittaker, 260. 
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also be used to “Compare” to other organizations across functional boundaries 
horizontally or to compare to other business units. 35  
 
 
Figure 5. The Seven Purposes of Performance Measures 
Some Examples of How DoD Now Uses Performance 
Measurement to Manage Contracts After Award  
Award Fee Type of Pricing Arrangements:  This type of contract provides a 
monetary base fee, plus an additional fee that is awarded periodically based on a 
subjective evaluation by the acquisition team of how well the contractor satisfied 
predetermined evaluation factors.  Contractor’s performance in such areas as 
responsiveness, quality, timeliness, management of risk and cost contract are examples 
of possible evaluation factors.  Important to note, however, is the acquisition team can 
change its evaluation criteria at designated milestones during contract performance.   
                                            
35  Marshall W. Meyer, Rethinking Performance Measurement: Beyond the Balanced Scorecard, 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30. 
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A good example of how performance measurement can be used to evaluate 
contractor effectiveness can be found in the contractor-operated Arnold Engineering 
Development Center (AEDC) USAF.  AEDC, whose mission is to support new 
aerospace systems by conducting R&D testing and to evaluate for the DoD and other 
government and commercial agencies, has been using competitively-awarded cost-
plus-award  fee-type pricing arrangements for over 25 years.  
Temple Bowling IV, Senior Contracting Official at AEDC, feels the award fee 
feature has enabled the Air Force to use the profit motive to incentivize contractors to 
continually improve productivity and quality while controlling cost. On the current 
contract, in over eight award fee evaluation periods, AEDC tracked an average of 283 
separate performance metrics.  It should be noted that the importance the government 
placed on performance factors to be measured did not remain static. Between 
evaluation periods, on average 22% of the performance goals were adjusted; 28% of 
the metrics from the previous period were deleted; and an average of 18% new 
performance measures were added. 36  
An advantage of this type of contract is that it improves communication between 
the two parties.  A disadvantage to both parties is the fact that there is a substantial 
administrative burden associated with the evaluation and review of the award fee 
evaluation information.  
Program Baseline Parameters: DoD 5000 series directives, which provide 
management principles and mandatory policies and procedures for managing all 
acquisition programs, require every program manager to establish goals for the 
minimum number of cost, schedule and performance parameters that describe the 
program over its life cycle. 37  
                                            
36  Data provided by Mr. Temple Bowling IV, Senior Center Contracting Official, AEDC/PK, February 
2004.  
37 DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003, Paragraph 4.3.4. 
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These goals represent the key performance parameters which serve as the 
program baseline; this baseline is essentially a contract between the program manager, 
Defense Acquisition Executive and Service Acquisition Executive. The approved 
program baseline parameters then serve as control objectives in that the program 
manager must report on the status of approved baseline parameters to the acquisition 
executives; the status of those baselines is also key to a program’s migration 
throughout the system’s development.    
Contracts for Performance-based Services: The contract is the common 
language between the buyer and seller and, therefore, it should lend itself to 
quantifiable measures of performance.  A guide to best practices for writing 
Performance-Based Service Contracts (P-BSC) was published by the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP). This document applies the GPRA concept in its 
instructions on the preparation of performance-based work statements (P-BWS).  The 
guide recommends describing the requirement in measurable performance standards. 
These standards should include such elements as “what, when, where, how many, and 
how well” the work is to be performed. This requires defining the required work in 
quantifiable terms with an acceptable error rate, which is referred to as an allowable 
quality level (AQL). 38 
Aircraft Service Contracts:  In describing the value of performance measures in 
the management of aircraft and facility maintenance service contracts, Ms. Cheryl Smith 
of Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC/LGCO) stated, “performance measures 
quantitatively tell us something important about the contractor’s products, services and 
the processes that produce them, i.e., how well the contractor is doing, is the contractor 
meeting its goals, are customers satisfied, are the contractor’s processes in statistical 
control, and if improvements are necessary, where are they needed?” 39  
                                            
38  A Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service Contracting, Final Edition, Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Executive Office of the 
Government, October 1998. 
39  Ms. Cheryl Smith, HQ AMC/LGCO, “Performance Measurement,” Undated, Briefing, Scott, AFB, IL. 
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AMC best practices include: (a) relying on commercial-quality standards, (b) 
having the contractor propose metrics and a quality plan, (c) only measuring critical 
outcomes because excessive metrics can be costly, and (d) including language in the 
contract permitting the negotiation of changes to the measures. 40  
Contractor Performance Evaluation Reporting:  As noted earlier, contractor 
performance assessments reports are required and maintained in the CPARS 
database. Dollar thresholds by business sectors for reporting positive as well as 
negative performance information on DoD contracts are (See Table 3): 
Business Sector   Dollar Threshold 
Systems      $5,000,000 
Ship Repair/Overhaul       $500,000 
Services      $1,000,000 
Information Technology         $1,000,000 
Operations Support     $5,000,000 
Fuels          $100,000 
Table 3. COPARS Dollar Thresholds by Business Sectors 
 
What Can Be Learned From Private Industry About Measuring 
Contractor Performance? 
Measuring Supplier Performance: From literature research, one can conclude 
that private industry collects supplier-performance data primarily for strategic sourcing 
purposes and to determine how well the purchasing department as a whole is 
                                            
40  Ibid. 
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performing.  The primary purpose is to use metrics at a macro level to judge 
performance of the procurement organization at the macro level.  
Typical is a comment by Terry Sueltman, Corporate Vice President of Purchasing 
and logistics, Sonoco Products. He believes purchasing and supply-chain management 
measures, to be effective, “must be more strategic, at a higher level to have a broad 
business impact and should lead change. Instead of talking of the price per part we use, 
talk about the impact on production cost.” 41 
The Center for Advanced Purchasing (CAPS) publishes a list of “Standard” 
Purchasing Performance Measures. The significance placed on the effectiveness of 
purchasing organizations in a macro sense can be judged by looking at the standards.  
Examples of the twenty-one CAPS standards are: purchasing operating expense dollars 
as a percent of sales dollars, percent change in total purchase dollars 
influenced/assisted by purchasing and the number of active suppliers accounting for 
80% of purchase dollars, percent of total purchase dollars spent through reverse 
auctions, and percent of purchase dollars spent through strategic alliances. 42     
What are the most important supplier characteristics?  In February 2002, The 
Journal of Supply Chain Management published the results of a random sampling of the 
over 2,000 members of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) members on formal 
supplier-evaluation programs. An analysis of the 299 responses was published as a 
report titled “Formal Supplier Evaluation Programs and the Factors Used to Channel 
Evaluations.”   A summary of the responses showed the following.   
• Less than half of the responding firms have formal supplier evaluation processes 
in place. (Formal supplier evaluations were aggregate evaluations of vendor 
performance rather than measuring ongoing outputs of a contract as part of 
contractor surveillance.)   
                                            
41  Terry Sueltman, “Supplier Performance Metrics That Really Make a Difference.” Supplier Selection and 
Management Report (September 2001) 11. 
42  “CAPS ‘Standard’ Purchasing Performance Measures: Supplier Performance Metrics That Really Make 
a Difference” Supplier Selection and Management Report. (September 2001). 12. 
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• For those who have a formal rating system, 
 Two-thirds ranked supplier performance relative to one another. 
 Over half evaluated suppliers on a routine basis. 
 Twenty-one percent of the suppliers were asked to perform self-evaluations.   
 Less than one-third of the responses indicated they had a system for 
weighing categories of evaluation. 
 There were over thirty different supplier characteristics. 43 (Table 4 illustrates 
the Top Ten Categories.) 
 
Table 4. Top Ten Categories  
From this survey, one can conclude that, for the most part, commercial industry 
uses performance measurement primarily to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
its purchasing department.  The lack of a formal supplier-evaluation program, like the 
DoD CPARS program, by less than half of those surveyed may be the result of the fact 
private industry is not subject to bid-protest rules as is the federal government.  
                                            
43  Penny M. Simpson, Judy A. Siguaw, and Susan C. White, “Measuring the Performance of Suppliers: 
An Analysis of Evaluation Processes,” Journal of Supply Chain Management: A Global Review of 
Purchasing and Supply Chain 38, no. 1 (February 2002): 29.   
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How do Commercial Firms Measure Services?  An analysis published by RAND 
on a study of  “fourteen innovative commercial customers and world-class providers of 
facilities management services” provided insight into how these firms used performance 
metrics to execute sourcing activities and to help manage their relationships and 
promote continuous improvement. 
The report concluded: 
• Customer and provider jointly choose metrics. 
 The customer tended to track output-oriented metrics. 
 The service provider may also track process-oriented metrics. 
• Both qualitative and quantitative measures were used. 
• Both parties refined their set of metrics as the relationship evolved. 
• Benchmarking studies were used to set feasible goals. 
• Both formal and informal reviews were held to communicate performance. 
• Both the generation of metrics and tracking of performance are costly.  
• Most common characteristics of metrics used are: 
 Finance cost and customer satisfaction. 
 Qualitative metrics on performance of specific services. 
• Special interests topics were also tracked.44  
(See Table 5: How Thirty Commercial Firms Measure Service.)  
                                            
44  Laura H. Baldwin, Frank Camm, and Nancy Moore, Strategic Sourcing: Measuring and Managing 
Performance, DB-287-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 
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Table 5. How Thirty Commercial Firms Measure Services 
Conclusion 
Primary Research Question:  Can Performance Measurement Be 
Used to Manage a Contractor’s Performance?  The Answer is 
Yes.  
Performance measurement can be used to manage contractor's performance 
after award.   
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires 
managers in the Executive Branch to develop strategic plans and to use performance 
indicators to record output and evaluate the outcome of each program.  The Act 
establishes a management framework that includes: 
• Development of strategic performance program plans with well-defined 
desired outcomes,  
• Development of performance Indicators for desired outcomes,  
• Definitions of outputs to track and measure results,  
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• Comparison of outputs to desired outcomes and,     
• Documentation of report results. (Reference Figure 2. The GPRA 
Performance Accountability Framework) 
This framework readily lends itself to the measurement of contractor performance 
and appears to be an appropriate way to manage contracts in the public sector.  
Currently, an integral part of the contract administration (management) process is 
contractor-performance-evaluation reporting.  However, such documentation is seen 
primarily as a way to mitigate the risk of selecting a contractor with a poor performance 
track record in the future. Examples of data that must be reported on a contractor’s 
performance include: (a) Contractor’s record of conforming to contract requirements and 
standards of good workmanship, (b) Contractor’s record of forecasting and controlling 
cost, (c) Contractor’s adherence to contract schedules, including the administrative 
aspects of performance, (d) Contractor’s history of reasonable and cooperative behavior 
and commitment to customer satisfaction, and (e) Contractor’s business-like concern for 
the interests of the customer.  It appears the reported data could easily be tailored to fit 
the need of a performance-measurement process. 
This study also notes Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard concept enables 
managers to visualize the breadth of an operation as well as to link measurements to 
strategy. As seen in Table 6 below, a visual depiction of The Balanced Scorecard 
Approach, the balanced scorecard methodology could be adapted to measure 
contractor performance in a manner that would enable the contract strategy, as well as 
critical success factors and desired outcomes, to be included in a contractor-
performance measurement process.  
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Table 6. The Balanced Scorecard Approach 
The result would be to add joint accountability for results to the buyer-seller 
relationship.    
It is also believed that both parties would jointly benefit from the enhancement of 
communications—communications that would no doubt result in the use of these 
indicators throughout the life of the contract rather than as a reporting mechanism after 
the fact.  
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